

**On Propositional Calculus
The Soundness and The Completeness
of The Non-Formal Systems**

(\mathcal{L}_{DSi} , $1 \leq i \leq 4$)

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Introduction:

The propositional calculus is a branch of mathematic logic some times called propositional logic, it deals with the study of mathematical and logic, it divides into two mains branches.

- Non Axiomatic logical systems (normal logical systems) .
- Axiomatic logical systems (the axiomatic logic).

In the study of non- Axiomatic logical systems we use a natural deduction system without axioms, which has an empty axiom set. to study and proof

Thermos of the deduction systems DS_i , $1 \leq i \leq 4$

1. Language and definitions:

1-1 Atomic proposition: An atomic proposition is a sentence contains only one content either true or falls. The small letters of the alphabet (a,b,c ...etc) standing as atomic proposition.

1-2 Operators: symbols denoting the following connectives (or logical operators): \neg , \wedge , \vee , \rightarrow , \leftrightarrow .

1-3 Parentheses: Left and right parentheses: $(,)$, $\{ [(,)] \}$

1-4 Complex proposition: a complex proposition is a composition of more than one atomic proposition with some operators and parentheses, the capital letters of the alphabet (A , B, C) standing as complex proposition.

1-5 well formed formula (wff): A well formed formula (wff) is a set of complex propositions is recursively defined by the following rules:

- Basis: Letters of the alphabet (usually capitalized such as A, , B, ,C, D , etc.) or the Greek alphabet (χ , ϕ , ψ) are well-formed formulas wffs is recursively defined by the following rules:

- Inductive clause I: If ϕ is a wff, then $\neg \phi$ is a wff.
- Inductive clause II: If ϕ and ψ are wffs, then $(\phi \wedge \psi)$, $(\phi \vee \psi)$, $(\phi \rightarrow \psi)$, and $(\phi \leftrightarrow \psi)$ are wffs.

1.6 Rules of inferences:

A rule of inference is a valid argument used to deduct a new wff from a previous wff the following are some of rules of inferences:

R_1 : Simplification	$p \wedge q \vdash p$	Simp
R_2 : Com mutative	$p \wedge q \vdash q \wedge p$	Com
R_3 : Conj unction	$p, q \vdash p \wedge q$	Conj

1.7 Rules of manipulation :

Proposition (1.1) : If A and $A \rightarrow B$ are tautologies, then so is B .

Proof. Suppose that A and $A \rightarrow B$ are tautologies, and that B is not. Then

there is an assignment of truth values to the statement letters appearing in A or in B which gives B the value F. But it must give A the value T since A is a tautology, and so it gives $A \rightarrow B$ the value F. This contradicts the assumption that $A \rightarrow B$ is a tautology. Hence B must be a tautology.

Rules of manipulation and substitution.

1.8 Rules of substitution:

Proposition (1.2): Let A be a wff in which the statement letters

P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n appear, and let A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n be any wffs. If A is a tautology then the statement form B , obtained from A by replacing each occurrence of P_i by A_i ($1 \leq i \leq n$) throughout, is a tautology also, i.e. substitution in a tautology yields a tautology.

Proof: Let A be a tautology and let P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n be the statement letters appearing in A . Let A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n be any statement forms. Assign any truth values to the statement letters which appear in A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n . The truth value that B now takes is the same as that which A would have taken if the values

which A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n take had been assigned to P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n respectively, namely T . Hence B takes value T under any assignment of truth values, i.e. B is a tautology.

Now consider the statement form $((A \wedge A) \rightarrow B)$. $(A \wedge A)$, which appears in this form, is logically equivalent to A (since $((A \wedge A) \equiv A)$ is a tautology). If we place $(A \wedge A)$ by A , we get $(A \rightarrow B)$. Now $(A \rightarrow B)$ is logically equivalent to $((A \wedge A) \rightarrow B)$. Again this is an instance of general proposition substitution

1.9 A proof:

We will use a natural deduction system, which has no axioms; or, equivalently, which has an empty axiom set. Derivations using our calculus will be laid out in the form of a list of numbered lines, with a single wff and a justification on each

line. Any given wff considered to be assumptions and written in the top of the proof . The conclusion will be on the last line. A derivation will be considered complete if every line follows from previous ones by correct application of a rule.

2.0 A Theorem:

The last wff in the proof called a theorem .

2.0 The deduction system DS1

In this section of this paper discussion and proofs of theorems of the non- formal systems DS1,ds2,DS3,DS4 will be presented.

Rules of inferences of DS1:

1. $(A \wedge B) \vdash A$ *Simplification*
2. $(A \wedge B) \vdash (B \wedge A)$ *Commutative*
3. $A, B \vdash (A \wedge B)$ *Conjunction*

Theorem2- 1-1: $A \wedge (B \supset C) \vdash A$

Proof

- 1) $A \wedge (B \supset C)$ *assum.*
- 2) A *1, simp.*

$A \wedge (B \supset C) \vdash A$

Theorem 2-1-2: $(B \vee C) \wedge E \vdash E$

- 1) 1. $(B \vee C) \wedge E$ *assumption*
- 2) 2. $E \wedge (B \vee C)$ *1, com.*
- 3) E *2, simp.*

$(B \vee C) \wedge E \vdash E$

Theorem 2-1-3: $C \wedge (\mathcal{D} \wedge \mathcal{E}) \vdash \mathcal{D}$

Proof:

- 1) $C \wedge (\mathcal{D} \wedge \mathcal{E})$ *assumption*
- 2) $(\mathcal{D} \wedge \mathcal{E}) \wedge C$ *1, com.*
- 3) $\mathcal{D} \wedge \mathcal{E}$ *2, simp.*
- 4) \mathcal{D} *3, simp.*

$C \wedge (\mathcal{D} \wedge \mathcal{E}) \vdash \mathcal{D}$

Theorem 2-1-4 : $\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{B} \wedge C \vdash C \wedge (\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{D})$

Proof :

1. $\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{D}$ *assumption*
2. $\mathcal{B} \wedge C$ *assumption*
3. $C \wedge \mathcal{B}$ *2, com.*
4. C *3, simp.*
5. $C \wedge (\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{D})$ *4,1, conj.*

$\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{B} \wedge C \vdash C \wedge \mathcal{D}$

Theorem 2-1- 5: $(\mathcal{A} \wedge \mathcal{B}) \wedge C \vdash \mathcal{B} \wedge C$

Proof :

1. $(\mathcal{A} \wedge \mathcal{B}) \wedge C$ *assumption*
2. $\mathcal{A} \wedge \mathcal{B}$ *1, simp.*
3. $C \wedge (\mathcal{A} \wedge \mathcal{B})$ *1, com.*
4. C *3, simp.*
5. $\mathcal{B} \wedge \mathcal{A}$ *2, com.*

6. \mathcal{B}

5, *simp.*

7. $\mathcal{B} \wedge \mathcal{C}$

4, 6, *conj.*

$(\mathcal{A} \wedge \mathcal{B}) \wedge \mathcal{C} \vdash \mathcal{B} \wedge \mathcal{C}$

The deduction system DS2

Rules of inferences of DS2

1. $(\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}), \neg \mathcal{A} \vdash \mathcal{B}$

Disjunctions syllogism(DS)

2. $(\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}) \vdash (\mathcal{B} \vee \mathcal{A})$

Commutative

3. $\mathcal{A} \vdash (\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B})$

Addition

Theorem 2-2-1:-

$\neg \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B} \vdash \mathcal{A}$

Proof

1. $\neg \mathcal{B}$

assumption

2. $\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}$

assumption

3. $\mathcal{B} \vee \mathcal{A}$

Com

4. \mathcal{A}

3, 1, *DS*

$\therefore \neg \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B} \vdash \mathcal{A}$

Theorem 2-2-2:-

$\mathcal{C} \wedge \mathcal{D} \vdash \mathcal{D} \vee \mathcal{E}$

Proof

1. $\mathcal{C} \wedge \mathcal{D}$

assumption

2. $\mathcal{D} \wedge \mathcal{C}$

1, *Com*

3. \mathcal{D}

Simp

$$4. \mathcal{D} \vee \mathcal{E} \qquad \text{Conj}$$

$$\therefore C \wedge \mathcal{D} \vdash \mathcal{D} \vee \mathcal{E}$$

Theorem 2-2- 3:-

$$(\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}) \wedge \neg \mathcal{B} \vdash \mathcal{A}$$

Proof

- | | |
|---|-------------------|
| 1. $(\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}) \wedge \neg \mathcal{B}$ | <i>assumption</i> |
| 2. $\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}$ | <i>1, simp</i> |
| 3. $\neg \mathcal{B} \wedge (\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B})$ | <i>1, Com</i> |
| 4. $\neg \mathcal{B}$ | <i>3, Simp</i> |
| 5. $\mathcal{B} \vee \mathcal{A}$ | <i>2, Com</i> |
| 6. \mathcal{A} | <i>5, 4, DS</i> |

$$\therefore (\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}) \wedge \neg \mathcal{B} \vdash \mathcal{A}$$

Theorem 2-2- 4:-

$$\neg(\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}), (C \supset \mathcal{D}) \vee (\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}), \neg \mathcal{D} \vdash (C \supset \mathcal{D}) \wedge (\mathcal{E} \vee \neg \mathcal{D})$$

Proof

- | | |
|--|-------------------|
| 1. $\neg(\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B})$ | <i>assumption</i> |
| 2. $(C \supset \mathcal{D}) \vee (\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B})$ | <i>assumption</i> |
| 3. $\neg \mathcal{D}$ | <i>assumption</i> |
| 4. $(\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}) \vee (C \vee \mathcal{D})$ | <i>2, Com</i> |
| 5. $C \supset \mathcal{D}$ | <i>2, 1, DS</i> |

$$6. \neg D \vee E \qquad 3, \text{Add}$$

$$7. E \vee \neg D \qquad 6, \text{Com}$$

$$8. (C \supset D) \wedge (E \vee \neg D) \qquad 5, 7, \text{conj}$$

$$\therefore \neg(A \vee B), (C \supset D) \vee (A \vee B), \neg D \vdash (C \supset D) \wedge (E \vee \neg D)$$

Theorem 2-2-5:-

$$\neg(B \supset C) \wedge A, (E \supset D) \vee (B \supset C) \vdash (D \vee A) \wedge (E \supset D)$$

Proof

$$1. \neg(B \supset C) \wedge A \qquad \text{assumption}$$

$$2. (E \supset D) \vee (B \supset C) \qquad \text{assumption}$$

$$3. \neg(B \supset C) \qquad 1, \text{Simp}$$

$$4. A \wedge \neg(B \supset C) \qquad 1, \text{Com}$$

$$5. A \qquad 4, \text{Simp}$$

$$6. (B \supset C) \vee (E \supset D) \qquad 2, \text{Com}$$

$$7. E \supset D \qquad 6, 3, \text{DS}$$

$$8. A \vee D \qquad 5, \text{Add}$$

$$9. D \vee A \qquad 8, \text{Com}$$

$$10. (D \vee A) \wedge (E \supset D) \qquad 9, 7, \text{Conj}$$

1. The deduction system DS3

Rules of inferences of DS3

$$1. (A \supset B), A \vdash B \qquad \text{Modus Ponnens (MP)}$$

$$2. (A \supset B), \neg A \vdash \neg A \qquad \text{Modus Tollens (MT)}$$

Theorem 2-3-1:-

$$A \supset B, A \vdash B$$

Proof

- | | |
|------------------|------------|
| 1. $A \supset B$ | assumption |
| 2. A | assumption |
| 3. B | 1, 2, MP |

$$\therefore A \supset B, A \vdash B$$

Theorem 2-3-2:-

$$\neg A \supset \neg B, \neg\neg B \vdash \neg\neg A$$

Proof

- | | |
|----------------------------|------------|
| 1. $\neg A \supset \neg B$ | assumption |
| 2. $\neg\neg B$ | assumption |
| 3. $\neg\neg A$ | 1, 2, MT |
- $$\therefore \neg A \supset \neg B, \neg\neg B \vdash \neg\neg A$$

Theorem 2-3-3 :-

$$A \wedge (A \supset B) \vdash B$$

Proof

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------|
| 1. $A \wedge (A \supset B)$ | assumption |
| 2. A | 1, Simp. |
| 3. $(A \supset B) \wedge A$ | 1, Com. |
| 4. $A \supset B$ | 3, Simp |
| 5. B | 2, 4, MP |

$$\therefore A \wedge (A \supset B) \vdash B$$

Theorem2-3-4:-

$$(A \supset B) \wedge (B \supset C), \neg C \vdash \neg A$$

Proof

- | | | |
|----|--|------------|
| 1. | (A \supset B) \wedge (B \supset C) | assumption |
| 2. | $\neg C$ | assumption |
| 3. | A \supset B | 1, Simp |
| 4. | (B \supset C) \wedge (A \supset B) | 1, Com |
| 5. | B \supset C | 4, Simp |
| 6. | $\neg B$ | 2, 5, MT |
| 7. | $\neg A$ | 3, 6, MT |

$$\therefore (A \supset B) \wedge (B \supset C), \neg C \vdash \neg A$$

Theorem 2-3-5 :-

$$(A \supset B) \wedge (B \supset C), C \supset D, A \vdash D$$

Proof

- | | | |
|----|--|------------|
| 1. | (A \supset B) \wedge (B \supset C) | assumption |
| 2. | C \supset D | assumption |
| 3. | A | assumption |

4. $A \supset B$		1 , Simp
5. $(B \supset C) \wedge (A \supset B)$		1 , Com
6. $B \supset C$		5 , Simp
7. B		3 , 4 ,
MP		
8. C		6 , 7 ,
MP		
9. D	2 , 8 , MP	
$\therefore (A \supset B) \wedge (B \supset C) , \neg C \vdash \neg A$		

The deduction system DS4

Rules of inferences of DS4

1. $(A \supset B) , (B \supset C) \vdash (A \supset C)$ Hypothetical Syllogism
(HS)
2. $(A \supset B) , (C \supset D) , (A \vee C) \vdash (B \vee D)$ Constructive
Dilemma(CD)

Theorem 2-4-1:- $\mathcal{A} \supset \mathcal{B} , C \supset \mathcal{A} \vdash C \supset \mathcal{B}$

Proof

- 1) $\mathcal{A} \supset \mathcal{B}$ assumption
 - 2) $C \supset \mathcal{A}$ assumption
 - 3) $C \supset \mathcal{B}$ 2 , 1 , HS
- $\therefore \mathcal{A} \supset \mathcal{B} , C \supset \mathcal{A} \vdash C \supset \mathcal{B}$

Theorem 2-4-2:- $\mathcal{A} \supset \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{C} \supset \mathcal{D} \vdash \mathcal{B} \vee \mathcal{D}$

Proof

- 1) $\mathcal{A} \supset \mathcal{B}$ assumption
- 2) $\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{C}$ assumption
- 3) $\mathcal{C} \supset \mathcal{D}$ assumption
- 4) $\mathcal{B} \vee \mathcal{D}$ 1, 2, 3, CD

$\therefore \mathcal{A} \supset \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{C} \supset \mathcal{D} \vdash \mathcal{B} \vee \mathcal{D}$

Theorem 2-4-3:- $\mathcal{D} \supset (\mathcal{A} \supset \mathcal{B}), \mathcal{D} \wedge \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{C} \supset (\mathcal{E} \supset \mathcal{A}) \vdash \mathcal{E} \supset \mathcal{B}$

Proof

- 1) $\mathcal{D} \supset (\mathcal{A} \supset \mathcal{B})$ *assumption*
- 2) $\mathcal{D} \wedge \mathcal{C}$ *assumption*
- 3) $\mathcal{C} \supset (\mathcal{E} \supset \mathcal{A})$ *assumption*
- 4) \mathcal{D} 2, *simp*
- 5) $\mathcal{C} \wedge \mathcal{D}$ 2, *com*
- 6) \mathcal{C} 5, *simp*
- 7) $\mathcal{E} \supset \mathcal{A}$ 3, 6, *MP*
- 8) $\mathcal{A} \supset \mathcal{B}$ 1, 4, *MP*
- 9) $\mathcal{E} \supset \mathcal{B}$ 7, 8, *HS*

$\therefore \mathcal{D} \supset (\mathcal{A} \supset \mathcal{B}), \mathcal{D} \wedge \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{C} \supset (\mathcal{E} \supset \mathcal{A}) \vdash \mathcal{E} \supset \mathcal{B}$

Theorem 2-4-4:- $\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}, (\mathcal{B} \supset \mathcal{D}) \wedge (\mathcal{A} \supset \mathcal{D}) \vdash \neg(\mathcal{D} \vee \mathcal{E}) \vee (\mathcal{E} \vee \mathcal{D})$

Proof

- 1) $\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}$ *assumption*

- 2) $(B \supset D) \wedge (A \supset E)$ *assumption*
 3) $B \supset D$ *2, simp*
 4) $(A \supset E) \wedge (B \supset D)$ *2, com*
 5) $A \supset E$ *4, simp*
 6) $E \vee D$ *1, 3, 5, CD*
 7) $(E \vee D) \vee \neg(D \vee E)$ *6, add*
 8) $\neg(D \vee E) \vee (E \vee D)$ *7, com*

$\therefore A \vee B, (B \supset D) \wedge (A \supset D) \vdash \neg(D \vee E) \vee (E \vee D)$

Theorem 2-4-5:- $(A \supset B) \wedge C, D \supset E, C \supset D \vdash B \vee E$

Proof

- 1) $(A \supset B) \wedge C$ *assumption*
 2) $D \supset E$ *assumption*
 3) $C \supset D$ *assumption*
 4) $A \supset B$ *1, simp*
 5) $C \wedge (A \supset B)$ *1, com*
 6) C *5, simp*
 7) $C \supset E$ *2, 3, HS*
 8) $C \vee A$ *6, add*
 9) $E \vee B$ *4, 7, 8, CD*
 10) $B \vee E$ *9, com*

$\therefore (A \supset B) \wedge C, D \supset E, C \supset D \vdash B \vee E$

3- The soundness and completeness of the DS_i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4

In this part of the paper we will prove the soundness and the completeness of the non-formal systems ($\mathcal{D}S_i$), $1 \leq i \leq 4$.

For both systems DS_i we suggest defining a symbol ($\mathcal{D}S_i$) to represent the set of all previous theorems DS_i , in Otherwise:

$$\mathcal{D}S_i = \{ DS_i, 1 \leq i \leq 4 \}.$$

3-1 Definition :(contradiction).

contradiction is a wff that is \perp under any possible T assignment of truth values of the wff .

Such propositions are called un-satisfiable. Conversely, a contradiction is $\neg T$.

3-2 Definition(soundness 1).

If $\mathcal{D}S_i$ is a set of theorems , and φ is a single wff , we say a deductive is sound if

$$\mathcal{D}S_i \vdash \varphi \supset \mathcal{D}S_i \vDash \varphi$$

to mean that φ may be derived from $\mathcal{D}S_i$ using only the rules of inference.

Remark .

Every theorem in $DS_i, 1 \leq i \leq 4, 1 \leq i \leq 4$ is T

3-3 Definition a model:

A model is a deductive system consisting a set of finite assumption , and a theorem $\mathcal{D}S_i$.

3-4 Definition.

If \mathcal{DSi} is consistent in deduction systems and if there is no wff φ such that $\mathcal{DSi} \vdash \varphi$ and $\mathcal{DSi} \vdash \neg\varphi$. Otherwise, \mathcal{DSi} is D-inconsistent.

Remark. If \mathcal{DSi} is a tautology then $(\neg\mathcal{DSi})$ is not satisfiable.

3-5 Definition.

If \mathcal{DSi} is deductive complete if it is deductive consistent and for every formula φ , $\mathcal{DSi} \vdash \varphi$ or $\mathcal{DSi} \vdash \neg\varphi$.

3-6 Definition (soundness 2).

If \mathcal{DSi} is a set of wffs, and φ is a single wff, we say a deductive is sound if \mathcal{DSi} is satisfiable then \mathcal{DSi} is deduction consistent.

Remark. An argument is sound if and only if :

1. The argument is valid.
2. All of its premises are true.

3-7 Definition (completeness 1).

If \mathcal{DSi} is a set of wffs, and φ is a single wff, we say a deductive is sound if :

$$\mathcal{DSi} \models \varphi \supset \mathcal{DSi} \vdash \varphi.$$

to mean that, for every model \mathcal{M} , if $\mathcal{M} \models \mathcal{DSi}$, then $\mathcal{M} \models \varphi$.

3-8 Definition (completeness 2).

If \mathcal{DSi} is a set of wffs, and φ is a single wff, we say a deductive is sound if \mathcal{DSi} is deduction consistent then \mathcal{DSi} is satisfiable.

3-9 The Completeness Theorem

An inspection of the set \mathcal{DSi} of formulae shows that every member of \mathcal{DSi} is valid. Note that if for wffs φ and ψ , if $\models \varphi$ and $\models \varphi \supset \psi$ then $\models \psi$.

3-10 Theorem (soundness)

If $\mathcal{DSi} \vdash \varphi$ then $\mathcal{DSi} \models \varphi$.

3-11 Theorem (Godel Completeness Theorem)

If $\mathcal{DSi} \models \varphi$ then $\mathcal{DSi} \vdash \varphi$.

3-12. Proposition .

Theorems 3-11 and 3-12 are equivalent.

Proof.

First, we assume that Theorem 3-11 is true and prove that Theorem 3-12 follows. Then, we assume that Theorem 3-12 is true and prove that Theorem 3-11 follows.

Suppose Theorem 3-11 is true. We want to show that Theorem 3-12 follows.

To that end, suppose that \mathcal{DSi} is consistent. We must show that there is a model \mathcal{M} such that $\mathcal{M} \models \mathcal{DSi}$.

\mathcal{DSi} is consistent. Thus, for every formula ψ , $\mathcal{DSi} \not\vdash (\psi \wedge \neg\psi)$.

Thus, by the contra positive of Theorem 3.10, it follows that $\mathcal{DSi} \not\models$

$(\psi \wedge \neg\psi)$. That is, it is not the case that every model that makes $\mathcal{D}Si$ true also makes $(\psi \wedge \neg\psi)$ true. Thus, there is a model in which $\mathcal{D}Si$ is true and $(\psi \wedge \neg\psi)$.

Thus, there is a model in which $\mathcal{D}Si$ is true, as required.

Thus, Theorem 3.11 entails Theorem 3.12.

Now, suppose Theorem 3.11 holds. And suppose that $\mathcal{D}Si \vdash \varphi$. Then there is no model of $\mathcal{D}Si, \neg\varphi$. Thus, by the contra positive to Theorem 3.12, $\mathcal{D}Si, \neg\varphi$ is not consistent. That is,
 $\mathcal{D}Si, \varphi \vdash (\psi \wedge \neg\psi)$

It follows from this that

$$\mathcal{D}Si \vdash (\neg\varphi \supset (\psi \wedge \neg\psi))$$

Thus ,

$$\mathcal{D}Si \vdash (\neg(\psi \wedge \neg\psi) \supset \varphi)$$

And, since $\mathcal{D}Si \vdash \neg(\psi \wedge \neg\psi)$, by modus ponens we have that

$$\mathcal{D}Si \vdash \varphi$$

as required. Thus, Theorem 3-12 entails Theorem 3-11. Thus, Theorem 3-11 and Theorem 3-12 are equivalent.

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